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This paper shows that stock market returns are related to ESG (Environment, Social and 
Governance) performance and that different areas of ESG performance affect returns in 
different ways. It shows that improved environmental performance is related with decreased 
returns, likely due to decreased idiosyncratic risk. At the same time improved social and 
governance performance is related to increased returns, meaning that these factors are 
indicators of quality. These insights are based on data from German and European stocks for 
the period from 2000 to 2020. Fixed-effect least square estimation was utilized. Additionally, 
the paper shows that there are some differences in these relationships depending on the size of 
firms. It also shows that these relationships are stronger in the time period after the financial 
crisis than for the period before the financial crisis.   
Keywords: ESG (Environment, Social and Governance), CSR (corporate social responsibility), 
SRI (socially responsible investment), sustainable finance, stock market analysis   
 
RESUMEN 
Este trabajo muestra que los rendimientos del mercado de valores están relacionados con el 
desempeño de ESG (Medio Ambiente, Social y Gobernanza empresarial) y que las diferentes 
áreas de ESG afectan a los rendimientos de diferentes maneras. Muestra que el desempeño 
ambiental mejorado está relacionado con una reducción de los rendimientos, probablemente 
por motivo de disminución del riesgo idiosincrásico. Al mismo tiempo, el mejor desempeño 
social y de gobernanza está relacionado con mayores rendimientos, lo que significa que estos 
factores son indicadores de calidad. Estos resultados se basan en datos de acciones alemanas y 
europeas para el período de 2000 a 2020. Se utilizó modelos de efecto fijo. Además, el trabajo 
muestra que existen algunas diferencias en estas relaciones en función del tamaño de las 
empresas. También muestra que estas relaciones son más fuertes en el período posterior a la 
crisis financiera que en el período anterior a la crisis financiera. 
Palabras clave: ESG (Medio Ambiente, Social y Gobernanza empresarial), CSR 
(Responsabilidad Social Corporativa), SRI (Inversión Socialmente Responsable), finanzas 
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This paper aims to investigate if ESG (Environment, Social and Governance) ratings are related 
to excess returns on a given stock and if they are a valid indicator for current and future 
performance. Furthermore, it aims to evaluate if these effects vary depending on the size of a 
given firm and if these correlations have changed over time, due to the increased interest in 
socially responsible investment in recent years.  
To some extend this investigation is only possible, because of the recent explosion in data being 
collected and published on this topic. An increasing number of firms have started publishing 
voluntary reports on their ESG performance since the early 2000s, which has further expanded 
within the European Union since the adoption of the non-financial reporting directive 
(Directive 2014/95/EU) making such publication mandatory for some firms since 2018. At the 
same time fundamental changes in collective investment have taken place. The proportion of 
capital being managed with sustainability goals in mind has increased considerably in the past 
decade, both through private special interest funds as well as adoption of sustainability goals 
by public investors (Puaschunder, 2016).  
This trend is likely to continue over the coming years, in light of the implementation of further 
legislation in this area, such as the EU’s Green Finance Initiative, which would require certain 
institutional investors to create and follow ESG strategies. It, therefore, stands to reason that it 
should be evaluated if and how the ESG performance of a given firm relates to their stock 
market performance, something which depends both on what ESG ratings say about a given 
firm and how investors utilise this information.  
This paper utilizes the following structure: The chapter entitled Background, discusses the 
history of ESG and CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) as a topic and how it has changed 
over time. It also highlights how different researchers have approached the topic. In the 
following chapter, Methodology, the approach taken by this paper is detailed and the variables 
and data used are described. In Results the empirical results of this paper are described at 
length. In the chapter Discussion, the results of this paper will be related to other works  
and potential interpretations will be discussed. In the Conclusion the results are presented  
in a concise manner. The Annex contains summary statistics and an overview of figures,  





Over the last two decades and more strongly since the great recession, corporate ESG strategy 
and sustainability have become important factors in how capital is allocated. While investors 
choosing where to place their capital have often taken into account additional goals apart from 
maximizing financial returns, doing so now has much broader appeal and is done in much more 
sophisticated ways than before. From the turn of the 21st century onwards the number of funds 
and institutional investors integrating ESG criteria in their selection processes has increased 
rapidly, especially within the last decade (Eccles, Kastrapeli and Potter, 2017). At the same 
time data providers have widened their coverage to include more metrics outside of traditional 
financial information. Additional reporting requirements have further increased the availability 
of information on company conduct (Christensen, Hail and Leuz, 2019).  
Research on ESG and CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) goes back more than four 
decades and ultimately is an extension of the long-standing debate about what the role of 
corporations within society should be. One side holds the view that firms should take into 
account social welfare and that investors should avoid certain investments, a prominent early 
example of this would be bonds supporting the apartheid regime in South Africa. The opposing 
view holds that profit maximisation should be the sole objective of firms, as it was famously 
argued by Milton Friedman (Friedman, 1970).  
More recently and taking the perspective of the investor side, no consensus has been reached 
on the question of how portfolio construction taking into account ESG criteria affects financial 
performance. The popular view — that arbitrary restrictions on the potential investment 
universe can only negatively affect potential returns — fails to consider that restrictions based 
on ESG criteria may not be arbitrary at all, but are likely related to how a firm operates and 
how it is seen by the public. Accordingly, how ESG performance relates to the return and risk 
of any given investment remains uncertain. Arguably this is not all that surprising, when 
considering that accurate modelling of investments, particularly in equity markets, still faces a 
number of barriers, with many competing, but imperfect, approaches being used.  
Despite that, many attempts have been made at explaining how ESG performance relates to the 
risk and performance of an underlying investment. The large number in variables available, 
and the introduction of comparable, though imperfect, ESG scores, which are the results of 
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complex data gathering processes, have made this kind of analysis much easier than it used to 
be even a few years ago. For investors interested in SRI (Socially Responsible Investment) 
strategies they also reduce information cost and enable more nuanced selection strategies going 
beyond simple exclusion criteria.  
2.2 Review of literature and methodology 
Empirical results still come to different and often times contrary results. Some of this is due to 
different markets being analysed, different indicators being chosen, differences in the 
underlying assumptions and the general difficulty in analysing financial markets. Further 
complicating the matter, the way in which ESG scores are constructed varies widely between 
data providers, including large differences in methodology. Some scores are based solely on 
publicly available information, others use surveys and questionnaires. They also differ in the 
choice and weighting of metrics within the score and how they impute and/or penalize missing 
data. Almost all scores use a best in class approach, where scores are relative in nature with 
respect to a given firms peer group. How these peer groups are defined can also vary 
considerably (Kotsantonis and Serafeim, 2019). This means that scores by different providers 
are difficult to compare directly and may have different blind spots. In practice using ESG 
scores is difficult to avoid, as there are few other metrics available or the metrics, that are 
available, are too limited in scope. For the environmental impact of a firm CO2 equivalent 
emissions are often the primary choice, but it is difficult to decide what the scope of emissions 
to be included should be. This could range from just direct emissions, to including any 
emissions generated throughout the whole product lifecycle, emissions generated by suppliers 
and emissions of activities financed by a company. It also ignores other types of pollution such 
as soil and water pollution. The same problem applies even more to social- and governance 
factors, with many potential datapoints being confidential. The few publicly available statistics, 
such as workplace deaths, are hardly comparable between industries.  
Within the literature, there are three primary methodological approaches used for this kind of 
analysis. One is using regression models of varying complexity to estimate coefficients that 
describe the relationships between variables. There are some obstacles to this, particularly 
regarding the choice of control variables and the distributional properties of financial returns. 
Another popular approach is creating a number of portfolios and comparing their relative 
performance, generally as an extension to the Fama-French three- or five-factor models (Fama 
and French, 1993, 2014). While this approach is an efficient way to reduce volatility and, 
therefore, get more stable results, there is some uncertainty about how the resulting coefficients 
are to be interpreted. This type of model is also dependant on how exactly portfolios are 
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constructed and how the market is defined. The third approach is to use specific events as 
natural experiments and to see if firms fare differently after such an occurrence. Most often, 
changes in policy, such as new publication requirements or expenditure obligations are used 
(Manchiraju and Rajgopal, 2017). The problem with this approach is that, in practice, such 
studies always estimate the effect of whichever policy was applied and not the effect of ESG 
performance in and of itself. As a result, it is impossible to use this approach to gauge how 
ESG performance and investor preference interact, and how this relation may have gradually 
changed over time. For the purposes of this paper a regression analysis approach is chosen, 
with some measures to resolve the potential issues that have been described. 
2.3 Distinguishing between CSR and ESG 
The meaning of CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) and ESG (Environment, Social and 
Governance) has changed over time with much more focus being placed on environmental and 
climate concerns recently. In practice, both terms are often used interchangeably. For the 
purposes of this document a distinction shall be made to provide more clarity. CSR is the older 
term used since the 1950s, while the acronym ESG was coined in 2005 as a result of an 
UN initiative, which has resulted in more precisely defined objectives and criteria for the latter. 
CSR often entails firms contributing to philanthropic goals, applying their workforce to 
volunteer work or supporting charities and similar organisations (Garriga and Melé, 2004). 
ESG performance, as the term is used currently, focuses on reducing (environmental) 
externalities, on treatment of the workforce and supply chain and on accurately following 
governance and reporting standards (van Duuren, Plantinga and Scholtens, 2016). The term 
CSR often is considered to include most of the areas named under ESG performance, but the 
reverse is usually not the case.  
With regard to classic CSR activities views in the literature diverge to a notable extend. Some 
authors argue that actively following CSR is not consistent with the primary goal of 
maximising profits and therefore return for shareholders, falling in line with Milton Friedman’s 
view. In this view, CSR activities could be the result of agency problems, where they benefit 
management rather than shareholders; or these activities simply are distractions that reduce 
managerial performance and waste company resources (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Masulis 
and Reza, 2015; Xu and Genton, 2015). The alternative view holds that CSR activities are 
indicators of good governance and could positively affect value by improving stakeholder 
relations and brand image (Dickinson, 1990; Ferrell, Liang and Renneboog, 2016). No clear 
answer to this question has been found through empirical means, with various studies 
supporting either view. The issue is further aggravated by the multitude of approaches to the 
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implementation and evaluation of CSR activities that are used and differences in the underlying 
frameworks with regard to what qualifies as CSR and what the goal of CSR activities should 
be (Garriga and Melé, 2004; Höllerer, 2012). Aggravating this issue, it is also difficult to assess 
the directionality of causality between CSR activities and financial performance.  
Focusing on ESG performance, as previously defined, may resolve some of these problems, as 
data providers usually define which factors are included and how they are weighted in their 
ratings. Often sub-scores for the three areas, to which the acronym refers, are available, 
allowing separate evaluation. Generally speaking, ESG scores usually deal more with how a 
company operates, rather than what activities a company engages in, in addition to its primary 
operation. This means that a company could receive very good ESG ratings without ever 
engaging in any philanthropic activities.  
Using ESG indicators also has the advantage that they are metrics used by investors to make 
investment decisions, second only to exclusion criteria in the spread of their adoption (Eccles, 
Kastrapeli and Potter, 2017). This means that they directly affect the market for socially 
responsible investment, and thus provide more practically useful insights. Results are also 
affected by the beliefs investors hold about using non-financial data and this may vary 
depending on the type of investor and their time horizon.  
There is still uncertainty about what role ESG ratings play in the evaluation of a given stock. 
They could be indicators of quality meaning that better ESG scores would predict higher 
returns. At the same time this could mean that better ESG performance would be associated 
with higher cost of capital, especially if this relationship holds outside of equity markets.  
An alternative to this would be the view that good ESG performance is associated with lower 
idiosyncratic risk, for example from environmental damage, legal risk and policy risk, factors 
unlikely to be captured by stochastic measures of volatility. This would justify investors 
accepting lower (risk adjusted) returns, with a reduction in non-volatility risk. It would also 
imply lower cost of equity for firms with better ratings, due to lower risk premiums. 
Unfortunately it is difficult to verify this, because measures of cost of equity are generally 
imprecise and difficult to substantiate (Fama and French, 1997; Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan, 2001), a situation that is aggravated by the increased tendency to provide 
shareholder return by other means than dividends. There is, however, some empirical evidence 
supporting the view that better ESG performance is associated firms being less capital 
constrained than those with worse performance (Cheng, Loannou and Serafeim, 2014).  
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III. FORMAL HYPOTHESIS 
To resolve some of these uncertainties regarding ESG performance and returns, the following 
hypotheses shall be the object of this paper. As there are various and often contrary views in 
the literature, both the possibility of positive and negative effects are considered as separate 
alternative hypotheses, resulting in the following structure: 
 H0:  Differences in ESG performance do not predict differences in returns. 
 HA1:  Better ESG performance predicts higher returns, supporting the view that 
ESG measures are an indicator of quality or that highly rated stocks are 
preferred by investors. 
 HA2:  Better ESG performance predicts lower returns, supporting the view that 
they either imply reduced efficiency or reduced idiosyncratic risk. 
If HA1 is correct, the interpretation is straightforward. If, on the other hand, HA2 ends up being 
the correct hypothesis, the mechanism of action has to be discussed. It could be the case that 
investors use bad ESG performance as an indicator of increased exposure to low probability, 
but high consequence events. These could take the form of physical damage due to 
environmental risk, lawsuits, or increased susceptibility negative consequences from policy 
change. Alternatively it could be an indicator for misapplication of funds and reduced 
efficiency, resulting in reduced shareholder returns.  
Apart from considering just the overall ESG score, its three main areas will be evaluated 
seperately. They are the Environmental Pillar, the Social Pillar and the Governance Pillar. This 
is done, because each pillar could interact in different and possibly contrary ways with the 
excess returns generated by a given stock. It is quite likely that specifically the Environmental 
Pillar would relate to returns in a different way than the other pillars, as it captures a more 
technological aspect than the other components. It also covers an area that is more at risk from 
policy change and where changes are more costly to implement. The social and governance 
aspect have more to do with organizational structure and workforce management, areas where 
improved ratings do not necessarily require large investments and where adjustements to 





Two datasets have been compiled to be used in this paper. The first one combines three german 
stock indices. The LDAX, which includes Germanys 30 most important firms, the MDAX 
which comprises 60 firms ranked right below the LDAX, and the SDAX, which consists of 70 
smaller firms. These were combined for a total of 180 firms and the dataset will be referred to 
as the DAX dataset. The second dataset, named STOXX600, comprises the members of the 
STOXX600 indice, which includes 600 of the most important european companies. Both 
datasets encompass data from the year 2000 until 2020, collected yearly at the end of the first 
quarter for each respective year. All low frequency variables, such as ESG scores (yearly) or 
enterprise reporting (quarterly) are updated within the first quarter, which means that in-period 
lag is minimized in comparison to high frequency variables, such as price or volatility, while 
still allowing time for information to diffuse and to affect market participants. 
The datasets take the form of unbalanced panel data, due to companies joining the index at 
different times. Some datapoints, particularly ESG scores are not available for all companies 
due to data not having been reported at the time. Coverage for ESG data was and  
still is better for large companies than for smaller companies, but coverage has expanded to  
cover a larger number of firms over time.  
To insure against the introduction of bias due to this fact, an auxilliary regression was run with 
the ESG score as the independent variable and market cap as the explanatory variable. While 
there is a clear correlation between the existence of an ESG ratings and market cap, no 
significant correlation between market cap and actual ESG scores has been found. Because the 
number of firms covered increases over time, more recent datapoints are included in the 
estimated models than earlier ones. This means that a certain level of recency bias is present in 
the estimated models, a fact that should be kept in mind. Figure 1 provides a graph indicating 
the ratio of firms with ESG scores present. Accordingly recent data has a somewhat higher 





Figure 1: Data availability ratio by year (own elaboration based on Thomson Reuters Refinitiv ESG scores) 
 
All data on individual firms used in this analysis has been collected through Thomson Reuters 
Datastream, which provides data sourced directly from stockmarkets, and from financial data 
providers such as Thomson Reuters Refinitiv and Worldscope. Data has been collected on 
Price, Market Value, various earnings measures, volatility, ESG scores and emissions, a variety 
of financial ratios, industry classification and, in the case of the STOXX600, country of 
headquarters.  
Government bond yield were used as proxies for the risk-free interest rate. For the DAX dataset 
ten year german treasury bonds are used; for the STOXX600 dataset a ten year euro area 
benchmark rate is used. Data for both is provided by the OECD. 
 
 12 
4.2 Selection of Variables 
The following variables have been included in the models. Some have been calculated from 
the available data due to not being available directly. 
4.2.1 Total Excess Return on Investment (RET) 
Total excess return on investment over one year, calculated as seen in Equation (1). (P) is the 
observed price of a given stock, corrected for stock splits and similar capital measures. 
Dividend per share (DPS) are the expected dividend payments over the following 12 months 
from time t. One-off special dividend payments are not included. (RFR) is the risk free rate at 




− 𝑅𝐹𝑅! (1) 
4.2.2 Total profit margin (PROF) 
The profitability of a company as indicated by its total profit margin, which is calculated as 
indicated by Equation (2) using earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as well as net revenue 
(NREV). As Profitability (PROF) follows a power law distributions, the natural logarithm of 






4.2.3 Market to Book ratio (MB) 
Equation (3) indicates how the Market to book ratio was calculated using Market Value (MV) 
and Book Value (BV). This is a factor often used as a fundamental value indicator, and is 







4.2.4 β volatility indicator (HBETA) 
Historical beta values for each firm as provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream. It is 
estimated using monthly price data for t to t-5 years for the firm and their respective index 
(LDAX, MDAX, SDAX or STOXX600). 
4.2.5 Net Revenue Growth Rate (gNREV) 
The year on year net revenue growth rate is included to account for the potential effects of 
changing firm size and is calculated as shown in Equation (4). Net Revenue growth rate 
(gNREV) was chosen over simply including Net Revenue (NREV), as an indicator of size, to 
avoid excessive colinearity with the unit constants, which would be present if just net revenue 
was used. This is the case, because firm size varies a lot between different firms and varies 
little over time. Changes in net revenue growth are also used by investors as an indicator of a 





4.2.6 ESG Scores 
A number of Thomson Reuters Refinitiv Scores are used in this paper. They were selected over 
ESG scores by other data providers mainly due to availability and the transparency of their data 
generation process. While direct physical measurements for the environmental factor, such as 
CO2 equivalent emissions are collected and have been used succesfully (Young In, Young  
Park and Monk, 2018), availability remains limited. Obvious quantifiable metrics for  
social and governance factors do not exist or are not sufficiently broad. Market participants  
also tend to use ESG scores by data providers or similar proprietary scores in their  
decision-making. Therefore ESG performance is approximated through ESG scores for the 
purposes of this paper.  
The Refinitiv ESG Environmental Pillar (ESGSCE), Social Pillar (ESGSCS) and Governance 
Pillar (ESGSCG) each rate the performance of a company in comparison to its industry peers 
for each respective area. The Environmental Pillar considers factors such as resource use, 
emissions and technological development. The Social Pillar reflects a companies treatment of 
its workforce, customers and surrounding community. The Governance Pillar evaluates 
management compliance with corporate governance principles, equal treatment of 
shareholders and ESG strategy implementation. Each score is based on more than 50 metrics 
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selected from a larger set of key performance indicators (KPI) according to industry group 
relevance and other factors. Scores are weighted depending on their materiality to each 
industry. The final scores are based on performance in comparison to industry peers for the 
Environmental and Social Pillars and in comparison to other firms of the same country for the 
Governance Pillar. The scores are normalized and distributed between 0 and 1.  
Only publicly available data is used to calculate the scores. This includes financial reports, 
separate ESG and CSR reports, the company’s website as well as information published by 
NGO’s and news sources. Lack of published data is penalized only if it affects certain KPI’s, 
specifically those most material to a given industry. 
The Refinitiv ESG Combined Score (ESGSC) combines the three pillar scores with equal 
weighting and adds penalisation for ESG Controversies, such as lawsuits, imposed fines and 
environmental damage when reported by news media.  
4.2.7 Discarded Variables 
Further variables often used to assess investments in financial markets were considered, but 
rejected, either due to not being significant in any of the base models, presence of notable 
collinearity, the same information already being better captured by other included variables or 
lack of data. These variables were Earnings per share, Return on Assets, Return on Invested 
Capital, Price to Earnings ratio and Enterprise value. Dummy variables for industry and 
country were also discarded, as was the inclusion of a time trend. 
4.3 Models 
4.3.1 Transformation of the dependent variable 
Total Return on Investment (RET), the dependent variable, exhibits some skew and is highly 
leptokurtic. This reflects a well known property of financial returns, namely fat tails 
(Kabašinskas et al., 2009). Most often the concern is the underestimation of tail-risk in risk 
analysis, but it also leads to overstatement of OLS coefficients under normal (close to mean) 
conditions. It does not affect joint significance (Oorschot, 2017) if no skew is present, but it 
can lead to inefficient estimation (Stoyanov, Samorodnitsky and Rachey, 2007). A large variety 
of approaches exists to deal with this issue ranging from trimming the data to using robust 
methods such as quantile regression (Balkema and Embrechts, 2018) or working with 
alternative distributions for the residuals (Stoyanov, Samorodnitsky and Rachey, 2007; Kring 
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et al., 2009). For non-critical applications the issue is often addressed by winsorizing the data. 
In this case the divergence from normality is continouus and with some skew present, meaning 
that winsorizing could not resolve the issue completely. Alternative transformations such as 
cube-root, square-root of absolute value and logarithms were considered but did not lead to 
satisfactory results. 
For the purposes of this paper an alternative approach has been chosen, using a two-part 
Lambert-W transformation which normalizes third and fourth order moments while 
maintaining first and second order moments, in accordance with the methodology laid out by 
Goerg (2015). This results in a gaussianised series named RET_G, which maintains the first- 
and second-order moments, a factor that aids interpretation. The method used for this involves 
matching two Lambert-W functions to the existing data, one for values above and another for 
values below the mean, using maximum likelihood estimation (Goerg, 2011, 2015). The 
resulting parameters (δl and δr) can then be used with the inverse of the Lambert-W function 
to remove skew and fat tails from the data.  
Applying the non-inverse function to results of models using this transformation allows 
producing point estimates. Generating a partial derivative of the function provides scaling 
factors that can be applied to predictions made by the model directly. 


































Equation (5) represents the underlying Lambert-W function with with X being the gaussianised 
data and Y being the original data, both taking the form of a N*T matrix. δ would be replaced 
by δl and δr depending on which side of μx the values are. Equation (6) is the derivative of (5) 




A variety of estimators were considered for this analysis. The primary candidates were simple 
OLS estimation, both random-effect and fixed-effect panel estimators as well as dynamic  
panel models. Dynamic models were rejected as no significant amount of autocorrelation could  
be detected. 
In the end fixed-effect OLS estimation was chosen, as this is indicated by the Joint significance 
test for differing group means when compared to pooled models, even when including 
dummies for Industry classification and country of origin, with p-values below 0.01 for both 
the DAX and STOXX600 datasets. The Breusch-Pagan test indicates that a pooled model is 
more appropriate than a random effects model, failing to reject H0. The Hausman test indicates 
that a fixed-effects model is a better fit than the random effects alternative, again with  
p-values below 0.01.  
Two main models were created and estimated on a variety of samples. Model 1 takes the form 
described in Equation (7) and was intended to measure the overall  effect of ESG-Performance 
on stock returns while controlling for a number of other variables. 
RET_G-,! = 𝛽/𝑐- + 𝛽#𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑆𝐶-,! + 𝛽&𝐻𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴-,! + 𝛽0l_PROF-,!
+𝛽1l_MB-,! + 𝛽2d_NREV-,! (7)
 
 
Model 2 replaces the ESG Combined score with a separate score for each pillar, to assess if 
there are differences in how each area relates to excess returns. The same controling variables 
as in Model 1 are included. Model 2 is defined by Equation (8). 
RET_G-,! = 𝛽/𝑐- + 𝛽#𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑆𝐶𝐸-,! + 𝛽&𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑆𝐶𝐸-,! + 𝛽0𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑆𝐶𝐸-,! + 𝛽1𝐻𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴-,! +
𝛽2l_PROF-,! + 𝛽3l_MB-,! + 𝛽4d_NREV-,! (8)
 
 
Apart from models using gaussianised returns (RET_G), both non-modified (RET) and 
winsorized returns (RET_W) were evaluated to insure the integrity of the results. As expected 
coefficients were smaller for winsorized and gaussianised data than for unmodified data and 
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R2 better for gaussianised returns than for the winsorised data. Accordingly gaussianised 
returns were used for all subsequent evaluations. 
The same models were run on restricted datasets to evaluate the presence of structural breaks 
and to see if the relationships between variables have changed over time. The period during 
and just after the great recession was also evaluated separately, to test if good ESG performance 
predicts higher robustness in a downturn.  
The following models were run on restricted datasets to see if the predicted variable 
relationships differ for specific time periods:  
1. Model E1 and E2 consider the period from 2001 to 2008, the period before 
the financial crisis. 
2. Model R1 and R2 consider the period from 2012 up till 2020, to test if the 
notable increase in Institutional investors taking into account ESG criteria as 
well as the emergence of specific ESG funds has lead to significantly 
different coefficients.  
3. Model CR1 and CR2 only take into account the period from 2008 to 2009 to 
see how the variables would interact during times of economic crisis. 
Additionaly, differences between firms based on their size were to be evaluated. While size 
differences were already corrected for by the base variables, additional models with 
longitudinal restrictions were run to test if coefficients would vary between groups. In this case, 
size would act as a multiplicative factor for ESG scores or other variables. In the case of DAX 
dataset the following subsamples were evaluated: 
1. Model L1 and L2 only take into account LDAX constituents, the 30 largest 
public companies in Germany. 
2. Model M1 and M2 are limited to MDAX constituents – a total of 80 firms 
right below the LDAX in term of size.  
3. Model S1 and S2 are limited to members of the SDAX – a total of 70 firms, 




For the STOXX600 a different approach was chosen to classify firms as large-, mid- and small-
caps, which were then used to run restricted models: 
1. Model L1 and L2 are limited to companies with market caps above the 50th 
percentile of the STOXX600 indice. This is equivalent to a market value of 
about €10 billion in 2019, which is a commonly chosen cutoff point between 
large- and mid-caps. It is also the cutoff used by various EUROSTOXX  
mid-cap indices. 
2. Model MS1 and MS2 take into account all companies below the 50th 
percentile in market-cap. Mid- and small-caps were not seperated, because 
the number of small-caps in the STOXX600 is very limited. When using the 
commonly used cutoff of about €2 billion in 2019, which is also used by 
EUROSTOXX mid-cap indices, the cutoff for small-caps would be below 




If not denoted otherwise, α = 0.05 is used as the relevant level of significance. Within the tables 
that summarize results, stars are used to indicate significance. One star refers to α < 0.1, two 
stars refer to α < 0.05 and three stars refer to α < 0.01, in accordance with the convention  of 
many statistical software packages. 
5.1 Results from Gaussianization 





Table 1 indicates the results of the auxilliary regression used to gaussianise the returns and 
therefore also the coefficients to be used for back-transformation. Figure 2 provides a graphical 
representation of the adjustement function and it’s first partial derivative, in correspondence 
with Equations (5) and (6) respectively.  
 
Figure 2: Lambert-W adjustment function (bottom) and partial derivative (above) 











Figure 3: Sample and Q-Q plots for RET, RET_W and RET_G 
Figure 3 provides sample plots and Q-Q plots for the original series (RET), a winsorized series 
with two-sided 5% cutoffs (RET_W) and for the gaussianised series (RET_G), for comparison 
purposes. Table 2 provides an overview for the summary statistics of the same series. Under 
normal circumstances (close to mean), predictions based on RET_G do not have to be adjusted, 
For predictions further away from the mean, adjustements would be recommended. 
Table 2: DAX Summary statistics for the dependent variable 
 
RET RET_W RET_G 
Mean 0.1464 0.1335 0.1187 
Median 0.1114 0.1114 0.1114 
Std. Dev. 0.4333 0.351 0.3456 
Skewness 2.2479 0.2561 0.1016 
Ex. kurtosis 20.925 -0.4886 -0.0001 
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5.2 Base Models 
Table 3: DAX Base Model 1 Results 
Model 1: Fixed-effects, using 881 observations 
Included 124 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 1, maximum 18 
Dependent variable: RET_G 
 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio   p-value  
  -------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0.545763     0.0762835     7.154    2.00e-12 *** 
  ESGSC      −0.151178     0.0836980    −1.806    0.0713   * 
  HBETA      −0.0750875    0.0374106    −2.007    0.0451   ** 
  l_PROF      0.148303     0.0213034     6.961    7.34e-12 *** 
  MB          0.0814808    0.0190702     4.273    2.18e-05 *** 
  gNREV       0.367805     0.0715683     5.139    3.52e-07 *** 
 
Mean dependent var   0.137151   S.D. dependent var   0.318288 
Sum squared resid    65.55982   S.E. of regression   0.295264 
LSDV R-squared       0.264616   Within R-squared     0.150607 
LSDV F(128, 752)     2.114023   P-value(F)           7.03e-10 
Log-likelihood      −105.6242   Akaike criterion     469.2483 
Schwarz criterion    1086.005   Hannan-Quinn         705.0947 
rho                 −0.182900   Durbin-Watson        1.946220 
 
Table 3 provides the results of the first base model, taking into account the overall  ESG score 
and a number of other independent variables. The model is jointly significant and results in a 
LSDV goodness of fit of 0.26. All coefficients are significant at the selected level of 
significance, apart from the ESG score with a p-value of 0.07. The ESG score is negatively 
correlated with the dependent variable, supporting the second alternate hypothesis HA2.  
In this case a one percentage point increase in the ESG score is correlated with a 0.15 p.p. 
decrease in returns. The coefficients of all other variables are in line with intuition and previous 
results. A one percent increase in profitability results in a 0.15 p.p. increase in returns. A one 
p.p. increase in the market to book ratio is correlated with a 0.08 p.p. increase in returns. 
Similarly a one p.p. increase in the net revenue growth rate is associated with a 0.37 p.p. 
increase in returns. Higher volatility as measured by historical β values are correlated with 
lower returns, though this might be the result of including the financial crisis in the dataset, 




Table 4: DAX Base Model 2 Results 
Model 2: Fixed-effects, using 881 observations 
Included 124 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 1, maximum 18 
Dependent variable: RET_G 
 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio   p-value  
  -------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0.372618     0.0881019     4.229    2.63e-05 *** 
  ESGSCE     −0.286081     0.101171     −2.828    0.0048   *** 
  ESGSCS      0.273632     0.101413      2.698    0.0071   *** 
  ESGSCG      0.178029     0.0829463     2.146    0.0322   ** 
  HBETA      −0.0737674    0.0374909    −1.968    0.0495   ** 
  l_PROF      0.144901     0.0212190     6.829    1.77e-11 *** 
  MB          0.0823914    0.0189605     4.345    1.58e-05 *** 
  gNREV       0.356728     0.0711491     5.014    6.66e-07 *** 
 
Mean dependent var   0.137151   S.D. dependent var   0.318288 
Sum squared resid    64.62551   S.E. of regression   0.293543 
LSDV R-squared       0.275096   Within R-squared     0.162712 
LSDV F(130, 750)     2.189384   P-value(F)           7.98e-11 
Log-likelihood      −99.30133   Akaike criterion     460.6027 
Schwarz criterion    1086.921   Hannan-Quinn         700.1055 
rho                 −0.201689   Durbin-Watson        1.975412 
 
Table 4 provides the result of the second base model, in which the three ESG pillars are 
included separately. The model shows a LSDV R2 of 0.28, with all explanatory variables being 
significant. The Environmental Pillar is negatively correlated with returns with a one p.p. 
increase in the score correlated with a 0.32 p.p. reduction in returns. The opposite is true for 
the Social Pillar and Governance Pillar where a one pp increase is correlated with a 0.23 p.p. 
and 0.17 p.p. increase, respectively. All additional variables are in line with the results observed 
in Model 1. Collinearity between the different ESG scores is found to be limited, though there 
is some collinearity with the unit dummys present according to the Belsley-Kuh-Welsch 
collinearity diagnostics. To insure against erroneous induction resulting from interaction 
between the three ESG pillar scores, three additional models were erstimated, each omitting 
two of the ESG pillar scores. The resulting coefficients were all close to those estimated in 
Model 2, with no coefficients diverging to a significant extend. 
The results of Model 2 indicate that for the Environmental Pillar HA2 is valid and that the 
variable is, therefore, associated with lower shareholder return. The social and Governance 
Pillar scores both have significant and positive coefficients, implying that HA1 is valid and that 
they are indicators of quality.  
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Both models do not show significant first-order autocorrelation according to the Durbin-
Watson and Wooldridge tests. Seasonal effects can be discounted as yearly data is used. The 
residuals are approximately normal, though they fail the usual normality tests. Both skew and 
kurtosis of the residuals are very limited, with a mean very close to zero. Serial correlation and 
heteroskedacity could also not be detected, resulting in spherical errors and, therefore, 
unbiased, consistent and efficient estimations. Both models were also run using the non-
gaussianised returns. Directionality of results is the same for all variables though coefficients 
are slightly larger, with notably increased standard errors in accordance with the expected 
results of using non-gaussianised data. Residuals are also notably less normally distributed and 
much more leptokurtic. 
5.3 Evaluation of structural change 
Table 5: DAX results for different time periods 
  Model E1 Model R1 Model CR1 Model E2 Model R2 Model CR2 
coefficients 2001-2008 2012-2020 2008-2009 2001-2008 2012-2020 2008-2009 
const 0.6032 *** 0.3565 *** 0.4292   0.3792 ** 0.4071 ** 2.6760 * 
ESGSC -0.0446   -0.2408 ** -0.6108               
ESGSCE             -0.0221   -0.4049 ** -1.4900   
ESGSCS             0.2637   0.1403   -2.2710   
ESGSCG             0.1451   0.0368   -0.4232   
HBETA 0.0873   -0.0914   -0.3896 * 0.0593   -0.1073 * -0.2650   
l_PROF 0.2467 *** 0.0768 *** -0.0231   0.2440 *** 0.0834 *** -0.0426   
MB 0.1048 ** 0.2191 *** 0.0988 * 0.1142 *** 0.2268 *** 0.1083 ** 
gNREV 0.4357 ** -0.0393   0.9144 * 0.3774 ** -0.0451   1.2490 ** 
                          
p-values                         
Joint 0.0895 * 0.0000 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0669 * 0.0000 *** 0.0002 *** 
const 0.7482   0.0728 * 0.8027   0.9725   0.8393   0.1419   
ESGSC 0.5173   0.3887   0.3696               
ESGSCE             0.1372   0.4679   0.4954   
ESGSCS             0.9522   0.5035   0.0674 * 
ESGSCG             0.8178   0.3120   0.2858   
HBETA 0.1285   0.7735   0.1252   0.2117   0.5701   0.3812   
l_PROF 0.0470 ** 0.0141 ** 0.1285   0.0436 ** 0.0362 ** 0.0980 * 
MB 0.5911   0.0016 *** 0.7459   0.4633   0.0011 *** 0.6270   
gNREV 0.6858   0.0000 *** 0.2448   0.9023   0.0000 *** 0.0724 * 
n 235   499   90   235   499   90   
LSDV R2 0.41   0.35   0.66   0.41   0.35   0.69   
 
 24 
Table 5 summarizes the results of Models 1 and 2 being run on restricted time periods to 
evaluate if the underlying behaviour has changed over time. The upper half of the table denotes 
the estimated coefficients with their respective level of significance. All models were tested by 
using the base model coefficients as linear restrictions for the restricted models and testing for 
both joint and individual significance. The resulting p-values are shown in the lower half of the 
table. The linear restriction tests for each variable are equivalent to the usual t-test, but using 
the previously estimated base model coefficients in place of zero.  
Overall, the relationships between the variables have remained stable over time in most cases, 
with a few noteworthy exceptions. Jointly the models restricted to recent data and those 
restricted to the financial crisis period are significantly different from the base models. None 
of the ESG scores differ to a significant extend from their base model values. Despite that some 
observations can be made: In the case of Model 1, the effect of ESG scores during the pre-
crisis period is negative, but much smaller and not significantly different from zero. For recent 
data the effect is slightly larger than in the base model, but not significantly different from it. 
It is however different from the early period (p-value = 0.059), indicating that a change in this 
relationship has occurred.  
Regarding the control variables, it can be observed that historical β values have very limited 
effect when ignoring the financial crisis, neither one being significantly different from zero. 
The positive correlation between profitability and returns is notably smaller in the recent data 
than it was the case in the period before the financial crisis. The same is true for net revenue 
growth, which recently are not significantly different from zero, while being significantly 
different from the base models. At the same time the positive coefficient for a given stocks 
market to book ratio has increased notably and also differs significantly from the base models 
for the more recent subsample.  
For Model 2 similar observations can be made. Behaviour of the control variables is similar to 
that observed for Model 1. The effect of the Environmental Pillar score is smaller and not 
significant for the early period, while being much stronger and significant for the more recent 
period. At the same time the, positive effects for the social and Governance Pillar are larger in 
the earlier period and notably smaller in the later period, though none of these coefficients are 
significant in their own right. This tendency could be explained by more widespread 
consideration of these factors as indicators of reduced risk and, therefore, requiring lower 
returns. The lower levels of significance observed for the early period likely is the result of  





When observing the period during the financial crisis, both models show strong negative 
correlations for both the overall  ESG score as well as all ESG sub-scores, though none of these 
results are significant. When taken at face value, the behaviour would be explained if we 
assume that better ESG performance usually requires large fixed-cost expenses and less 
flexible employment models. It has to be kept in mind, however, that none of the values are 
significantly different from the base models or from zero.  
5.4 Differences between firms of different size 
Table 6: DAX results by index membership 
  Model L1 Model M1 Model S1 Model L2 Model M2 Model S2 
coefficients LDAX MDAX SDAX LDAX MDAX SDAX 
const 0.4619 *** 0.5242 *** 0.9037 ** 0.2449 ** 0.4699 ** 0.5140   
ESGSC -0.1015   -0.3696 ** 0.1919               
ESGSCE             -0.4017 *** -0.1989   -0.1298   
ESGSCS             0.4857 *** 0.0153   0.2161   
ESGSCG             0.1441   -0.0873   0.7132 *** 
HBETA -0.0625   -0.0693   -0.1366   -0.0915 * -0.0712   -0.0764   
l_PROF 0.1447 *** 0.1254 *** 0.2040 *** 0.1316 *** 0.1213 *** 0.1755 *** 
MB 0.1045 *** 0.1749 *** 0.0350   0.1118 *** 0.1813 *** 0.0453   
gNREV 0.4744 *** 0.6329 *** 0.1401   0.4558 *** 0.6357 *** 0.1169   
                          
p-values                         
Joint 0.0669 * 0.0000 *** 0.0002 *** 0.1327   0.2619   0.1346   
const 0.9725   0.8393   0.1419   0.2698   0.6150   0.7121   
ESGSC 0.1372   0.4679   0.4954               
ESGSCE             0.4140   0.6357   0.5334   
ESGSCS             0.1103   0.1658   0.8364   
ESGSCG             0.7502   0.1090   0.0191 ** 
HBETA 0.9522   0.5035   0.0674 * 0.7288   0.9707   0.9792   
l_PROF 0.8178   0.3120   0.2858   0.6454   0.5909   0.5544   
MB 0.2117   0.5701   0.3812   0.3673   0.1066   0.2250   
gNREV 0.0436 ** 0.0362 ** 0.0980 * 0.4283   0.0645 * 0.0285 ** 
n 392   308   181   392   308   181   




Table 6 shows the results of Model 1 and 2 with the dataset restricted by index membership. 
Only Model M1 and S1 are significantly different from the base model. It also is necessary to 
take note of the reduced number of observation included in the models for the MDAX and 
SDAX, despite those indices including a much larger number of companies than the LDAX. 
This is caused by the significantly worse coverage for constituents of those indices, particularly 
with regard to ESG scores, which leads to fewer valid obervations.  
For Model 1 the negative effect of the overall ESG score is larger and more significant for 
MDAX constituents than for either the LDAX or SDAX, but none of the results differ to a 
significant degree from the base model. Most of the controlling variables are significant and in 
in line with the base model results. The only exception to this in the net revenue growth rate 
which is significantly larger for LDAX and MDAX members than for smaller firms, with those 
two coefficients being significantly different from the base models.  
For Model 2 the estimated coefficients for the Environmental Pillar and Social Pillar are 
notably larger and more significant for large firms than for MDAX and SDAX constituents. 
None of the scores apart from the governance score in the case of SDAX firms are significantly 
different to the base model. The SDAX Governance Pillar score is notably larger than for other 
firms, the estimated coefficient being significantly different from the base model and from 
zero. 
Taking a more general prespective it seems that the estimations of the base model apply to 
firms largely independent of their size. While there are significant differences in some of the 
variables, these differences are limited to magnitute. The directionality of the results is 
maintained in all cases. 
5.5 Comparison with the STOXX600 Dataset 
The same estimations that were performed on the DAX dataset were repeated on the 
STOXX600 dataset to corroborate the results of the former with a set of firms working under 
more heterogeneous circumstances and to see if the results could be generalized. When 
comparing base model results, it can be noted, that directionality has been maintained in all 
cases and the resulting coefficients follow a similar pattern as the DAX models. There are 
however some differences with regard to magnitude and significance of some of the variables. 
In general, the STOXX600 models resulted in lower R2 values, a result likely explained by the 
fact that companies are operating under much more varied circumstances. Members of the 
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STOXX600, smaller ones in particular, not only serve different primary markets, they also 
operate under differing regulatory and tax regimes. While fixed-effect estimators are able to 
account for country and industry fixed effects, they are not able to account for differing 
development between countries over the period of time that has been considered.  






The estimated factors used to gaussianise the returns (Table 7) are very similar to those used 
for the DAX returns, indicating that returns for the DAX and STOXX600 datasets follow a 
similar distribution. Table 8 and Table 9 show the base model results for the STOXX600 
dataset.  
Table 8: STOXX600 Base Model 1 results 
Model 1: Fixed-effects, using 6160 observations 
Included 550 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 1, maximum 18 
Dependent variable: RET_G 
 
             coefficient    std. error    t-ratio   p-value  
  ---------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0.369852      0.0235587     15.70     2.18e-54 *** 
  ESGSC      −0.0127362     0.0274149     −0.4646   0.6423   
  HBETA      −0.0374136     0.0115272     −3.246    0.0012   *** 
  l_PROF      0.110202      0.00699954    15.74     1.10e-54 *** 
  MB          0.00537957    0.00165857     3.243    0.0012   *** 
  gNREV       3.75829e-05   4.95863e-05    0.7579   0.4485   
 
Mean dependent var   0.114725   S.D. dependent var   0.271660 
Sum squared resid    396.3296   S.E. of regression   0.265914 
LSDV R-squared       0.128046   Within R-squared     0.047434 
LSDV F(554, 5605)    1.485719   P-value(F)           1.44e-11 
Log-likelihood      −290.4171   Akaike criterion     1690.834 
Schwarz criterion    5423.671   Hannan-Quinn         2985.414 






Table 9: STOXX600 Base Model 2 results 
Model 2: Fixed-effects, using 6160 observations 
Included 550 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 1, maximum 18 
Dependent variable: RET_G 
 
             coefficient    std. error    t-ratio   p-value  
  ---------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0.349005      0.0297836     11.72     2.39e-31 *** 
  ESGSCE     −0.0993420     0.0332182     −2.991    0.0028   *** 
  ESGSCS      0.110891      0.0344201      3.222    0.0013   *** 
  ESGSCG      0.00936190    0.0260223      0.3598   0.7190   
  HBETA      −0.0358059     0.0115324     −3.105    0.0019   *** 
  l_PROF      0.109224      0.00699676    15.61     8.27e-54 *** 
  MB          0.00536906    0.00165935     3.236    0.0012   *** 
  gNREV       3.14692e-05   4.95720e-05    0.6348   0.5256   
 
Mean dependent var   0.114725   S.D. dependent var   0.271660 
Sum squared resid    395.4026   S.E. of regression   0.265650 
LSDV R-squared       0.130085   Within R-squared     0.049662 
LSDV F(556, 5603)    1.506942   P-value(F)           2.34e-12 
Log-likelihood      −283.2045   Akaike criterion     1680.409 
Schwarz criterion    5426.697   Hannan-Quinn         2979.654 
rho                 −0.109903   Durbin-Watson        1.966662 
 
In the case of Base Model 1, the ESG score coefficient is only slightly negative, and not 
significant. The same is true for the net revenue growth rate. The other variables vary in 
magnitude but are significant and in line with the DAX results. Base Model 2 results are more 
closely related to the DAX results. The Environmental Pillar score is significant and negatively 
correlated with returns, though to a smaller extend than in the DAX model. The positive effect 
of the Social Pillar is also significant and smaller than in the DAX dataset. The Governance 
Pillar score, while positive, is close to zero and not significant. The other variables are all 
smaller but similar to the DAX model, with only net revenue growth being not significant.  
Table 10 shows the results of estimating different subsamples to check for structural change. 
Overall the results are again similar to the DAX dataset, though smaller in magnitude. 
Differences from the base model are limited, particularly for the ESG scores. In the case of 
Model 1 the overall ESG score is close to zero and not significant for both the early and the 
more recent subsamples. Profitability is in line with the DAX model with a reduced effect in 
the recent subsample. Interestingly higher volatility is significant and positive for the early 
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period. It is worth noting that the net revenue growth rate is not significantly correlated with 
returns, apart from during the financial crisis.  
Table 10: STOXX600 results for different time periods 
  Model E1 Model R1 Model CR1 Model E2 Model R2 Model CR2 
coefficients 2001-2008 2012-2020 2008-2009 2001-2008 2012-2020 2008-2009 
const 0.3123 *** 0.2287 *** 0.4305 *** 0.2383 *** 0.2514 *** 0.8985 *** 
ESGSC 0.0091   -0.0248   -0.3269 **             
ESGSCE             -0.0418   -0.1038   -0.4955 ** 
ESGSCS             0.1058 ** 0.0928   -0.3471   
ESGSCG             0.0708   -0.0422   -0.1498   
HBETA 0.0822 *** 0.0164   -0.3306 *** 0.0789 *** 0.0141   -0.3205 *** 
l_PROF 0.1569 *** 0.0534 *** 0.1228 *** 0.1547 *** 0.0528 *** 0.1212 *** 
MB 0.0549 *** 0.0022   0.2256 *** 0.0552 *** 0.0023   0.2139 *** 
gNREV 0.0001   0.0027   0.2760 *** 0.0001   0.0021   0.2759 *** 
                          
p-values                         
Joint 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 
const 0.2421   0.0000 *** 0.6065   0.0546 * 0.0902 * 0.0226 ** 
ESGSC 0.6651   0.7437   0.0336 **             
ESGSCE             0.2615   0.9475   0.1095   
ESGSCS             0.9228   0.7641   0.0800 * 
ESGSCG             0.1643   0.2259   0.3168   
HBETA 0.0001 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0000 *** 
l_PROF 0.0005 *** 0.0000 *** 0.7070   0.0008 *** 0.0000 *** 0.7214   
MB 0.0000 *** 0.0705 * 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0807 * 0.0000 *** 
gNREV 0.5468   0.6779   0.0000 *** 0.5311   0.7457   0.0000 *** 
n 1928   3170   692   1928   3170   692   
LSDV R2 0.33   0.18   0.59   0.33   0.18   0.59   
 
For Model 2 none of the ESG sub-scores are significantly different from the base models. The 
coefficients for the Environmental Pillar are notably more negative recently than they were 
before the great recession, but they are not significantly different from zero or the base model. 
The Social Pillar score is mostly in line with the base model. The Governance Pillar is not 
significant for either period, as it was the case for the base model. The controling variables are 
in line with the results observed for Model 1.  
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During the financial crisis a similar pattern to the DAX dataset can be observed. The overall 
ESG score has a notably more negative score than under normal circumstances and is 
significantly different from the base model. With regard to Model 2, all ESG sub-scores are 
negatively correlated with total returns, as was the case in the DAX dataset. The Environmental 
Pillar score is significant, while the other pillar scores are negative, but not significant. None 
of the values are significantly different from the base models, however.  
Table 11: STOXX600 results for large-caps and smaller firms 
  Model L1 Model MS1 Model L2 Model MS2 
coefficients Large-Caps Small- & Mid-Caps Large-Caps 
Small- & Mid-
Caps 
const 0.1331   0.2838 *** 0.1119   0.3358 *** 
ESGSC 0.0200   -0.0712           
ESGSCE         -0.0368   -0.1855 *** 
ESGSCS         0.1413 *** 0.0816   
ESGSCG         0.0379   -0.0317   
HBETA -0.0238   -0.0378 ** -0.0273 * -0.0360 * 
l_PROF 0.1091 *** 0.1090 *** 0.1080 *** 0.1067 *** 
MB 0.0075 ** 0.0043 ** 0.0073 *** 0.0047 ** 
gNREV 0.0000   0.0068   0.0000   0.0060   
                  
p-values                 
Joint 0.3314   0.6934   0.2231   0.3553   
const 0.0241 ** 0.4328   0.0248 ** 0.9053   
ESGSC 0.3304   0.2231           
ESGSCE         0.1541   0.1054   
ESGSCS         0.5092   0.5887   
ESGSCG         0.4047   0.3143   
HBETA 0.3791   0.9853   0.5838   0.9938   
l_PROF 0.9066   0.9141   0.8924   0.8185   
MB 0.4415   0.6207   0.4818   0.7435   
gNREV 0.8413   0.3200   0.8477   0.3782   
n 3457   2703   3447   2703   
LSDV R2 0.15   0.17   0.15   0.18   
 
The results of estimating coefficients for different sizes of firms are mostly similar to those 
resulting from the DAX dataset. None of the subsample models are jointly different to their 




For Model 1 the negative correlation between ESG score and returns is not found for large 
firms. For mid- and small-caps a negative relationship is found, but it is not sufficiently 
significant. The coefficients estimated for the controlling variables are in line with the base 
Model, significant and stable. A similar pattern can be observed for Model 2. Particularly the 
Environmental Pillar score is more negative for smaller firms than for larger firms, and also 
more significant. It is also notably different from the base model, though only with a p-value 
of 0.099. The Social Pillar score is larger and more significant for large firms than for smaller 
firms, while the Governance Pillar is small and not significant in any case. 
These results are not too surprising when comparing the structure of the DAX and STOXX600 
datasets. In the DAX dataset only 25 firms had market-caps above € 10bn in 2019. In the 
STOXX600 about half of the firms are above that cutoff point. In that sense the DAX dataset 
more closely resembles the mid- and small-cap dataset of the STOXX600, than the set for 
large-caps. The majority of the LDAX would rank above, but close, to the 50th percentile of 




6.1 Discussion of results 
Overall the analysis described in this paper confirms that ESG scores are significantly related 
to the returns a given stock achieves. Over the last two decades a higher combined ESG score 
is associated with slightly lower returns for DAX firms. While the same relationship can  
be observed for the STOXX600, results were smaller and not significant enough to be  
considered confirmatory.  
More interesting are the results of evaluating the relationship between the three ESG pillar 
scores and returns. Notably the relationship is different for the different components of the ESG 
score. This is a result that warrants some discussion. 
The Environmental Pillar score is negatively correlated with returns. This result was found to 
be valid in both datasets, even though the effect size was smaller in the case of the STOXX600, 
meaning that hypothesis HA2 can be assumed to be generally valid. The existing literature may 
provide some insight into which of the potential mechanisms — reduced efficiency or reduced 
risk — is the actual mechanism causing this result. Assuming that lower risk is the correct 
mechanism, capital should be available relatively easily to firms with good environmental 
records. This is a result confirmed in a recent study by Cheng, Loannou, and Serafeim (2014), 
which confirms that firms with better ESG performance, particularly with regard to the 
Environmental Pillar, are less capital constrained. A different study employing a Fama-French 
model approach (Young In, Young Park and Monk, 2018), finds that firms with lower carbon 
emissions (one of the most important factors in the Environmental Pillar score) tend to have 
higher risk adjusted returns in models that include additional risk indicators apart from 
volatility. Another study that analysed socially responsible mutual funds (Chatterjee et al., 
2018) also confirms this hypothesis. Additionaly survey results indicate that asset managers 
use ESG ratings for the purposes of risk management (van Duuren, Plantinga and Scholtens, 
2016). 
Another potential indicator to assess the mechanism of this result is by considering how the 
environmental scores effect has changed over time. If the observed relationship is the result of 
less efficiency and wasted funds, one would assume that it would lead to reduced shareholder 
returns consistently. If it was however the result of being seen as an indicator of risk, a change 
in behaviour after the financial crisis would be expected, as low returns in the bond markets 
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have made stocks more attractive to traditionally low risk investors. Increased interest in 
environmental concerns and sustainable investment would also lead to increased effect size if 
investors take these factors into account. This is a result clearly observed in the data, where the 
estimated coefficient is much larger for recent data than for data from before the financial crisis. 
While this should not be seen as proof, it can be considered as convincing evidence, particularly 
in consideration of the additional literature mentioned.  
The results for the Social- and Governance Pillar, which indicate a positive relationship with 
returns allow a somewhat more straightforward explanation as being indicators of good 
workforce and supply chain relations and good governance. Particularly in the case of the 
governance score, the relative importance of shareholder rights and management quality 
indicators means that a positive effect matches intuition. These results are also in line with the 
literature, where studies that are mostly concerned with the social and governance aspects of 
CSR find that better scores are associated with less agency concerns and better governance 
(Ferrell, Liang and Renneboog, 2016) and lower information asymetry (Cui, Jo and Na, 2018).  
While the positive effect for the Governance Pillar could not be confirmed with the STOXX600 
dataset, this could be the result of STOXX600 members being mostly homogenous due to their 
size, but the score using country specifc peer groups. As large international companies tend to 
suffer less from governance concerns than smaller firms, STOXX600 members may all rate 
highly compared to their national peer group, leading to similar scores for most companies and 
obfuscating differences between STOXX600 constituents. For the DAX dataset, where all 
firms are part of the same peer group, this issue is not present. It can, therefore, be assumed 
valid that HA1 is the correct hypothesis for the governance and social components of ESG 
performance, meaning that these metrics are indicators of quality.  
When considering how estimated coefficients change for different time periods, it is quite 
obvious that particularly the Environmental Pillar is increasingly an important measure to be 
considered. For firms, it means that bettering environmental metrics may be a net benefit  
due to reducing cost of equity. To some extend these improvements could also carry over to  
reduce cost of debt as well (The Economist, 2020), thereby reducing cost of capital in general.  
For investors it means that, increasingly, concern about policy risk and changing capital  
allocation have to be taken into account when determining the risks and potential rewards  
of an investment.  
When looking at different sizes of firms, the results seem to apply more strongly to small large-
caps and large mid-caps. This is likely the case, because firms in this group vary the most with 
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regard to how they approach ESG issues. Most truly large firms already have advanced 
strategies in place, while too little data is available for small-caps. These results can be expected 
to change however, as coverage by third-party data providers expands to an increasing number 
of firms. For truly small public firms that are not traded regularly in liquid markets, the benefits 
of adopting ESG strategies are likely limited and might not cover the incurred costs. The 
specific industry a firm operates in, can also affect how costly collecting data on ESG 
performance is and if improving those metrics is a worthwhile endeavour. Trying to enforce 
CSR activities from a policy side has been shown to negatively affect shareholder value and 
waste funds, especially if crudely implemented, while the same is not true for voluntary 
activities (Manchiraju and Rajgopal, 2017).  
6.2 Potential for further inquiry 
There are a number of further avenues of research that could expand on the results presented 
in this paper. The most direct ways of doing so would be to confirm if these effects are valid 
when using ESG scores by other providers and how the results vary depending on the 
methodolody employed by the data provider. Another area of interest would be to test if the 
results of this paper are valid for other markets, particularly the US market and Asian markets, 
as both regulation and the attitudes of market participants may differ considerably in 
comparison to Europe. In addition to that, a similar model to the one used here could be applied 
to bond markets as cost of debt is much easier to measure than cost of equity. This would likely 
allow better discernment of risk and return. Apart from that, it is quite likely that future EU 
legislation, especially the EU Green Finance Initiative and the European Green Deal could 
provide natural experiments that could evaluated to test if better environmental scores did 




This paper provides some clear evidence that better environmental performance is associated 
with lower returns, but likely lower idiosyncratic risk as well, while both better social and better 
governance performance can be seen as indicators of quality that are associated with higher 
returns. This divergence in the effect of the disaggregated ESG measures indicates that they 
describe factors that, altough often used together, interact with the potential risks and returns 
of a given investment in distinct ways. Overall the findings indicate that ESG ratings can be 
employed productively by investors. For firms they mean that improving certain areas of ESG 
performance can be used to reduce cost of capital. Extrapolating current trends would mean 
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                 Mean     Median       S.D.        Min        Max 
RET            0.1464     0.1114     0.4333    -0.9105      5.960 
RET_W          0.1335     0.1114     0.3510    -0.4709     0.8723 
RET_G          0.1187     0.1114     0.3456    -0.8523      1.559 
ESGSC          0.5095     0.4792     0.1588     0.1617     0.9333 
ESGSCE         0.6519     0.6853     0.2142     0.1247     0.9916 
ESGSCS         0.6661     0.6954     0.2034    0.06310     0.9906 
ESGSCG         0.5189     0.5269     0.2090    0.03770     0.9828 
HBETA          0.8700     0.7990     0.5702     -3.013      6.253 
l_PROF         -2.294     -2.261      1.065     -8.126      2.107 
MB             0.9067     0.4284      6.023     -27.50      240.2 






                 Mean     Median       S.D.        Min        Max 
RET            0.1161     0.1027     0.3453    -0.9234      4.193 
RET_W          0.1073     0.1027     0.2836    -0.4173     0.6560 
RET_G          0.1008     0.1027     0.2837    -0.7314      1.251 
ESGSC          0.5313     0.5047     0.1615    0.08410     0.9391 
ESGSCE         0.6730     0.7004     0.1944    0.02630     0.9932 
ESGSCS         0.6477     0.6755     0.1963    0.03620     0.9917 
ESGSCG         0.5520     0.5682     0.2107    0.01800     0.9900 
HBETA          0.9557     0.9070     0.8253     -27.16      49.70 
l_PROF         -2.006     -1.997      1.021     -10.25      7.249 
MB              1.011     0.5306      8.026     -130.1      691.6 






9.2 Units and reference codes for variables 
 
Variable Units Description Datastream Code 
Symbol — Ticker Symbol WC05601 
P € Price P 
MV €*1000 Market Value MV 
NOS — Number of Shares NOSH 
DPS € Dividend per Share DPS 
DY Ratio Dividend Yield DY 
HBETA Ratio Historical Beta 897E 
ESGSC Ratio ESG Total Score TRESGCS 
ESGSCE Ratio ESG Environment Pillar Score ENSCORE 
ESGSCS Ratio ESG Social Pillar Score SOSCORE 
ESGSCG Ratio ESG Governance Pillar Score CGSCORE 
NREV €*1000 Net Revenue WC01001 
EBIT €*1000 Earnings before interest and taxes WC18191 
EBITDA €*1000 EBIT & depreciation WC18198 
EPS € Earnings per share EPS 
PE Ratio Price/Earnings Ratio PE 
ROE Ratio Return on Equity WC08301 
ROA Ratio Return on Assets WC08326 
ROIC Ratio Return on invested capital WC08376 
GENINDCLASS — General industry classification WC06010 
COUNTRY — I/B/E/S country code IBCTRY 
 
